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Honeycutt: Pre-Enforcement Review of an Administrative Ruling

PRE-ENFORCEMENT REVIEW
OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE RULING
In exploring administrative law, every precaution should be
taken. Fundamentals should not be presumed. Administrative
law exists but defies coherent explication. It is not a single
subject, but a whole congeries of separate subjects, each, moreover, so dynamic that it is almost impossible to write upon it
without being out of date by the time of publication.'
Justice Clark in describing administrative law remarked:
"From a functional standpoint the administrative agency is a
hybrid. ...
'They are part elephant, part jack rabbit and part
field lark.'Since its inception administrative law has met with profound
criticism. However, its most articulate defender states:
The power of judicial review under our traditions of government lies with the courts because of a deep belief that
the heritage they hold makes them experts in the synthesis
of

design. .

. [D]ifficulties...

have

arisen. . because

courts cast aside that role to assume to themselves expertness in matters of industrial health, utility engineering, railroad management, even bread baking. The rise of the administrative process represented the hope that policies to shape
such fields could most adequately be developed by men bred
to the facts. That hope is still dominant, but its possession
bears no threat to our ideal of the "supremacy of law". Instead, it lifts it to new heights where the great judge, like a
conductor of a many-tongued symphony, from what would
otherwise be discord, makes known through the voice of
many instruments the vision that has been given him of
man's destiny upon this earth.3
It is the purpose of this note to examine the relationship between the courts and administrative agencies. When viewed in
an historical light, this relationship appears to be one of change
and uncertainty. However, this is not surprising when one
considers the metamorphic nature of administrative agencies.
From simple beginnings as legislative aids, today some are practically entities in themselves. The focus of this paper is pri1. See Miller, Book Review, 34 GEo. WAsH. L. Rsv. 970 (1965-66); West-

wood, The Davis Treatise: Meaning to the Practitioner,43 MINN. L.

607 (1958-59).
2. Clark, Administrative Justice, 13 AD. L. REv. 6, 7-8 (1960-61).
3. J. LANDIS, THE ADmINISTRATIVE PROCESS 154 (1938).
437

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

Rzv.

1

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 4

[Vol. 20

SOUTH CARoiNA LAw REVIW

marily aimed at the problem of when may the courts intervene
in the administrative process and provide a forum for one who
feels injured by an administrative ruling.
I.

ADwINISTRATIVE

REVIEW: JuDicIAL

ATTITUDE

The early attitude toward administrative decisions was one of
nonreviewability on the theory that interference would be productive of nothing but mischief and confusion.4 In American
&hooZ of Magnetic HeaZing v. McAnnulty" the Supreme Court
first asserted that a limited review is appropriate unless Congress specifically provides against it or unless special reason appears for denying review.6 Modern decisions have raised this
assertion into a presumption in favor of review that may be
rebutted by an affirmative indication of legislative intent against
7
reviewability.
The Administrative Procedure Act provides for judicial review to any person suffering a legal wrong because of agency
action.8 This is true unless a statute precludes such review or
the action is committed by law to agency discretion. 9 For a
statute to preclude judicial review there must be clear and convincing evidence of this intent and a failure to provide specifically for judicial review is not evidence of an intent to withhold
review. 10 From this the courts have adopted a view of "hospitable" interpretation to expand the availability of judicial review." Based on this standard the courts look directly to the
2
statute before them.'
Generally, no one is entitled to judicial relief for supposed or
threatened injury until prescribed administrative remedies have
been exhausted.' 3 This rule came into being simply as a policy
4. See, e.g., Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. 497, 516 (1840).
5. 187 U.S. 94 (1902).
6. Id. at 103.
7. E.g., Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962) ; Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S.
229 (1953); Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947). See 15
F.R.D. 411, 427 (1954) for an analysis of the Heikkila case.
8. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(a), 60 Stat. 243 (1946), as amended,

5 U.S.C. § 702 (1966).
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Community Nat'! Bank v. Gidney, 192 F. Supp. 514 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, (1962).
Shaughnesy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955).
Levers v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 219 (1945).
See FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279 (1965).
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adopted by the courts,14 and will be by-passed if there is good
reason for making an exception. 1 5
Another requirement before review-ripeness-is based on
whether there is a justiciable conflict between the agency and the
plaintiff. Both the Administrative Procedure Act 16 and the
Declaratory Judgment Act'17 require ripeness.
This question focuses on the nature of the judicial process and
the basic principle that judicial machinery should be conserved
for real and imminent problems, not squandered on abstract and
hypothetical ones.' 8 "[Ilts basic rationale is to prevent the courts,
through avoidance of premature adjudication, . . . from judicial interference... "until formal and concrete action is taken
by the agency. 19
The scope of judicial review was broadened in the recent cases
of Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner" and Gardner v. Toilet
GoodsAssociation,21 in which the Supreme Court allowed review
prior to the enforcement of an administrative ruling.
The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act provides that label
or advertising material relating to prescription drugs will be
deemed "misbranded" unless the "established name" is printed on
the label and other printed material "is printed prominently and
in type at least as large as that used thereon for any proprietary
name or designation for such drug." 22 The Commissioner of
Food and Drugs, after inviting and considering comments submitted by interested parties, promulgated regulations that require the established name to be displayed each time the brand
2
name appears. 2
14. Smith v. United States, 199 F.2d 377 (lst Cir. 1952).
15. United States v. Harvey, 131 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. Texas 1954); see

Jaffe, The Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 12 BuFF. L. REv. 327,
328-29 (1962-63).
16. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(c), 60 Stat. 243 (1946), as amended,

5 U.S.C. § 704 (1966).
17. Declaratory Judgment Act 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964).
18. 3 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 21.01 (1958).
19. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967).
20. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).

21. 387 U.S. 167 (1967).
22. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 502(e) (1) (B), as amended,

76 Stat 790 (1962), 21 U.S.C. § 352(e) (1) (B) (1964) (label and labeling) ;
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 502(n) (1), added by 76 Stat. 791
(1962), 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (1)

(1964)

(advertisements).

23. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1.104(g), 1.105(b) (1966).
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In Abbott, a group of drug manufacturers and a drug manufacturers' association brought suit for a declaratory judgment
that these regulations were void and for an injunction against
their enforcement. Plaintiffs contended that the "each time"
requirement went beyond the scope of the act and that without
immediate judicial relief, they would be confronted with the
dilemma of choosing between costly compliance with the regulations or evasion of the regulations, involving the risk of criminal
prosecution. 24 The district court granted the relief sought 25
but the court of appeals reversed. 20 In allowing pre-enforcement
review the Supreme Court held that the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act did not preclude such review, and that the
controversy was ripe for judicial resolution. 27
In the companion case of Gardner v. Toilet Goods Association,2 8 the plaintiff brought suit for pre-enforcement declaratory
and injunctive relief, contending that the Commissioner of Food
and Drugs exceeded his statutory authority in regulations prescribing conditions for the use of color and additives in food,
drugs, and cosmetics. 29 Of the three challenged regulations, one
extended the definition of "color additives" to include certain
finished products, such as lipstick, and rouge, as well as color
components.3 0 Another defined "all diluents" to include noncolor ingredients of cosmetics as well as those actually serving
to dilute colors. 31 The third regulation limited the scope of a
statutory exemption of hair dye products from normal clearance
requirements.8 2 The Supreme Court held that the challenge was
ripe for review because the issue was a straight forward legal

question, consideration of which would not necessarily be facili24. It should be noted that the threat of criminal sanctions for noncompliance was unrealistic. The Solicitor General had represented that if court enforcement became necessary, the Department of Justice would proceed only
civilly for an injunction or by condemnation.
25. Abbott Labs. v. Celebrezze, 228 F. Supp. 855 (D. Del. 1964).
26. Abbott Labs. v. Celebrezze, 352 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1965).
27. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
28. 387 U.S. 167 (1967).
29. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, §§ 706(a)-(c), 21 U.S.C.
§ 352 (9) (c) (1964). Four regulations were in issue, the fourth asserting the
agency's right to inspect cosmetic formulae and process was decided against
plaintiff and will not be discussed here. Toilet Goods Ass'n. v. Gardner, 387
U.S. 158 (1967); 21 C.F.IL § 8.28(a) (4) (1966).
30. 21 C.F.R. § 8.1(f) (1966).
31. 21 C.F.R. § 8.1(m) (1966).
32. 21 C.F.R. § 8.1 (u) (1966); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
§601 (e), 52 Stat. 1054 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 361 (e) (1964).
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tated if raised in the context of a specific attempt to enforce the
regulation, and that the regulations were self-executing and had
an immediate and substantial impact on the manufacturers. 3
II. THE CoURT's

HANDLING OF THE STATUTE

The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act includes a specific
procedure for review of certain enumerated regulations. 4 The
government contended that other types were necessarily meant
to be excluded. The Court concluded, however, after an extensive look into the legislative history, that there was no legislative purpose to eliminate judicial review of non-enumerated
agency action. Also the "savings clause"3 5 was interpreted to
be in harmony with the policy favoring judicial review.
The confusion and general unreliability of using statutory provisions was summed up by a leading authority:
When statutes are silent concerning judicial review, as many
are, the administrative action is sometimes reviewable and
sometimes not. When statutes provide that the administrative action "shall be final" the action is sometimes reviewable and sometimes not. When statutes provide that the
action "shall not be reviewed," the action is sometimes
36
reviewed and sometimes not.
III.

EXHAUSTION

The exhaustion doctrine requires that when a remedy before
an administrative agency is provided, relief must be sought by
exhausting this remedy before the courts will act. The doctrine
determines at what stage a person may secure review and is
instrumental in promoting proper relationships between the
courts and administrative agencies. 3 7 The logic of the rule is
that the remedy of administrative review is available on the
33. Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n., 387 U.S. 167 (1967).

34. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, §§ 701(e)-(f), 52 Stat. 1055
(1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 377(e)-(f) (1964).
35. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, § 701(f) (6), 52 Stat. 1056

(1938), 21 U.S.C. § 371(f) (6) (1964); see Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288,
308 (1944) in which the Court used a similar savings clause in determining the

availability of review.
36. 4 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATIsE, § 28.01 (1958).
37. United States v. R.C.A., 358 U.S. 334 (1958); United States v. Western
Pacific R.R., 352 U.S. 59, (1956).
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litigant's initiative and will protest his claim of right.3 8 Its
principal application is to compel parties to take full advantage
of the available administrative remedies and thus serves to prevent private litigants from ousting administrative bodies from
the exercise of adjudication properly committed to them.3 9
In Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Oorp.40o the Supreme
Court said that the long settled rule is that no one is entitled to
judicial relief until the prescribed administrative remedy has
been exhausted. However, the courts use wide discretion in
applying the doctrine. In several cases the Court has passed upon
questions of administrative jurisdiction without requiring exhaustion, 41 while invoking the requirement in others.42 The two
leading authorities also seem to be at odds over the exhaustion
question. 43 Professor Davis contends that there is no rule of
exhaustion, but rather a discretionary power used by the Court
to refrain fTom having to offer a rational explanation of why
in a particular case it goes one way and not the other.4 4 On the
other hand, Professor Jaffe insists that the rule is not discretionary but is applied in an absolute fashion by the Court.4 5
The South Carolina Supreme Court has recognized that the
exhaustion requirement is not a rigid rule, but a discretionary
matter left to the courts. 46 However, this is only a token recognition because the South Carolina Court has refused to hear an
appeal until the agency has completed its proceedings. 47
38. Jaffe, The Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 12 BuF,. L.
327 (1963).

REV.

39. See generally 2 Am. Jup. 2d Administrative Law § 598 (1962).
40. 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
41. Allen v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535 (1954); Bethlehem
Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947);
Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U.S. 557 (1919); Indeed, the
Court by-passed the exhaustion question in Greene v. United States, 376 U.S.
149 (1964) by first deciding the substantive issue.
42. Franklin v. Jonco Aircraft Corp., 346 U.S. 868 (1953); Macauley v.
Waterman S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540 (1946); Public Utilities Comm'n v. United

Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456 (1943).
43. Davis, Judicial Control of Administrative Action, 66 COLUm. L. REv.
635 (1966); Jaffe, The Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 12 BUFF.
L. Rxv. 327 (1963); Schulz, Book Review, 19 AD. L. REv. 217 (1967).
44. Davis, Judicial Control of Administrative Action, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 635,
657 (1966); See also 2 Am. Jun. Administrative Law § 600 (1962).
45. Jaffe The Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, supra note 43, at 328.
46. Pullman Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 234 S.C. 365, 108 S.E.2d 571
(1959).
47. E.g., DePass v. City of Spartanburg, 234 S.C. 198, 107 S.E.2d 350
(1959); Isgett v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 223 S.C. 56, 74 S.E.2d 220
1953); American Surety Co. v. Muckenfuss, 172 S.C. 169, 173 S.E. 290
1934).
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Because of the discretionary character of the exhaustion rule,
there are occasions for dispensing with the usual requirements.
Court intervention otherwise premature, would be appropriate
if the agency acted outside its scope of competence. Also exhaustion may not be required if an agency has inadequate administrative remedies so that the requirement would be futile. 43 It is
often stated that exhaustion does not apply when an issue of
constitutionality is raised. The precedents, however, present
conflicting views. In Aircraft & Diesel Eguipment Corp. v.
Hirsch, 49 the Court applied the exhaustion requirement, invoking the rule that constitutional issues should be avoided. The
Court tried to rectify the conflicting precedents by stating in
Public Utilities Commission . United States:5°
If. . . an administrative proceeding might leave no remnant of the constitutional question, the administrative
remedy plainly should be pursued. But where the only question is whether it is constitutional to fasten the administrative procedure onto the litigant, the administrative agency
may be defied and judicial relief sought as the only effective
way for protecting the asserted constitutional right.5 '
Despite an abundance of statements that judicial relief is
withheld until remedies are exhausted, the cases show that exhaustion is sometimes required and sometimes not. A guide
might be to look to the extent of injury of a party if he pursues
the administrative remedies. The Court illustrated this particularly well in the Abbott case. The clarity of administrative
jurisdiction and the extent of specialized administrative understanding should be equally considered in applying the exhaustion
rule.

52

IV.

RirEmVss

But my maturing view is that courts do law and justice a
disservice when they close their doors to people who, though
not in jail nor yet pienalized, live under a regime of peril
48. Jorgensen v. Pennsylvania R.R., 25 N.J. 541, 138 A2d 24 (1958) ; Levers
v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 219 (1945).
49. 331 U.S. 752 (1947); Allan v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535

(1954). Contra, Lichter v. United States, 344 U.S. 742 (1948).
50. 355 U.S. 534 (1958).
51. Id. at 539-40.
52. 3 DAvis ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 20.10 (1958); see Folk,
Administrative Law, 1961-62 Survey of S.C. Law, 15 S.C.L. Rnv. 2, 27
(1962-63).
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and insecurity. What are courts for, if not for . . . adjudi-

cating the rights of those against whom the law is aimed,
53
though not immediately applied?
As noted ripeness is based on the principle that only real and
imminent problems are considered by the court in order to avoid
premature adjudication. The Administrative Procedure Act provides that review, unless otherwise provided for under a given
statute may be had only from "final agency action". 54 Courts
have generally construed the requirement broadly, looking to
the consequences of the agency's action.5 5 It has been held that
an agency order, although not the last order in an administrative
proceeding, is "final" for purposes of review if it imposes an
obligation, denies a right or fixes some legal relationship which
may cause irreparable injury.5 6 This "pragmatic" interpretation
of the finality element is best illustrated in Columbia B ,oadcasting System v. United States. 57 The Court took a flexible view
of finality by looking to the need for protecting the appellant
from threatened injury by agency regulation. Two later cases
extended further this flexible view by allowing review by determining the regulations at issue to be "self-executing" such
that promulgation foreclosed any action except compliance or
liability for noncompliance. 53 .
V. CONCLUsION
The Supreme Court has often closed the judicial doors in the
name of ripeness and exhaustion. It may have been hesitant to
enter this area because of a fear that it might disrupt the administrative process. However, when the choice is between interrupting the administrative machinery and aiding a private
litigant who has suffered a definite injury, the Court should not
hesitate to follow the latter course. As the Court stated in
Abbott:
53. Public Affairs Associates v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111, 116 (1962) (Douglas, concurring).
54. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(c), 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C.
§ 704 (1966); See Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Delta Air Lines, 367 U.S. 316
(1964); See generally Comment, "Final" Orders: Section 10(c) of the A.P.A.,
STAw. L. R v. 531 (1953-54).
55. See Lam Man Chi v. Bouchard, 314 Ff2d 664, 670 (3d Cir. 1963).
56. Northeast Airlines Inc. v. C.A.B., 345 F2d 662 (1st Cir. 1965).
57. 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
58. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956) ; Frozen
Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol20/iss3/4

8

Honeycutt: Pre-Enforcement Review of an Administrative Ruling
1968]

NoTs
o

Where the legal issue presented is fit for judicial resolution,
and where a regulation requires an immediate and significant change in the plaintiff's conduct of their affairs with
serious penalties attached to noncompliance, access to the
courts . . . must be permitted, absent a statutory bar or
some other circumstance .... 59
JAZZs R. HoNLcuTT

59. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 153 (1967). The Court noted the
day to day effect on business and also the "sensitive" character of plaintiff's
business.
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